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THE INCREASINGLY "UNFLAGGING OBLIGATION":




The tension inherent in the study of federal jurisdiction and the federal courts is
perhaps best understood as the result of attempts to effectuate two often irreconcilable
commands: first, that federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction I and
second, that they nevertheless have a "virtually unflagging obligation... to exercise the
jurisdiction given them."2 Increasingly, in recent years, this tension has manifested itself
as a sharp divide between the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts over the
scope of various explicit (or implicit) doctrinal and statutory exceptions to the federal
jurisdiction conferred by general jurisdictional statutes such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332,
and 1334. 3 In a pattern that has come to repeat itself time and again, the lower courts
have consistently favored applicability of these exceptions, with the Supreme Court,
often unanimously, reversing in favor of original federal jurisdiction. 4
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. This article was prepared in conjunction with
the Tulsa Law Review's 2005-2006 Supreme Court Symposium, for my participation in which I owe special
thanks to Mark Tushnet, the Symposium's guest editor, and Misty Cooper Watt, the Review's Editor-in-Chief.
My thanks also to Patrick Gudndge and David Vladeck for their comments and camaraderie, to Rick
Bierschbach, Bruce Boyden, Lynda Dodd, Amanda Frost, Toby Heytens, and especially David Zaring for
insightful and thoughtful feedback at a junior faculty colloquium at the Washington & Lee School of Law, and
to Jason Berkowitz for excellent research assistance. By way of disclosure, I played a recurring role on the
legal team for the petitioner in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
1. E.g. Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah Servs, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2616-17 (2005) (citing Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 511 U.S. 375,377 (1994)).
2. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist v. U S, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); see also Cohens v. Va., 19
U.S 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) ("It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not:
but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should .... We have no more right to decline the
exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.").
3. It bears noting that there is something wholly unsatisfying about the statutory/ doctrinal distinction I
draw in this Article Even for cases-such as Roche, 546 U.S. 81 (2005), and Schmidt, 126 S. Ct. 941
(2006)--where the interpretation of the diversity statute is at issue, the requirement of "complete" diversity
animating both decisions is itself arguably doctrinal, read into § 1332's predecessor by Chief Justice Marshall
in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); so too, the federal question statute and the "well-pleaded
complaint rule," per Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Similarly, one might think of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the probate exception as both being predicated, to some degree, on statutory
construction, the former on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1331, and 1332, and the latter on 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
4. The jurisdictional trend comes notwithstanding the general substantive hostility to litigation that some
have found as a consistent pattern in the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. See Judith Resnik, Constricting
Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 223 (2003); Andrew M. Siegel,
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For federal courts scholars, the Supreme Court's decision last Term in the case of
Anna Nicole Smith,5 known to the legal world as Marshall v. Marshall,6 is one of the
more prominent. There, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had concluded that the so-
called "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction applied to divest the federal bankruptcy
court of jurisdiction over Anna Nicole's counterclaim against her stepson Pierce for
tortious interference. 7 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that
the probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment of a will
and the administration of a decedent's estate; it also precludes federal courts from
endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the custody of a state probate court. But it
does not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and otherwise
within federal jurisdiction.8
That is, the Court held that the probate exception was, at most, a narrow bar to
jurisdiction applicable only to hyper-specific facts-foreclosing jurisdiction only where
federal courts were asked to directly interfere with the res of a state probate proceeding.
9
What is intriguing about Anna Nicole's case, besides the obvious, is the extent to
which it is representative of a far larger trend that has emerged in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence concerning federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Consistently, over the last
several years, the Court has taken an increasingly skeptical view toward doctrinal or
statutory exceptions to federal jurisdiction, and has, in almost every case where such an
exception was argued to be at issue, held that it did not apply, and that the case could go
forward in a federal forum. So too, the Court has looked askance at lower court
decisions interpreting requirements for entitlement to statutory relief as "jurisdictional,"
as in the Arbaugh case from last Term.
10
During the 2005 Term alone, Marshall was one of six cases the Court decided on
The Court against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1097 (2006).
5. This article was already in production when Anna Nicole passed away on February 8, 2007. See
Abby Goodnough & Margalit Fox, Anna Nicole Smith Is Found Dead at a Florida Hotel, N.Y. Times A12
(Feb. 9, 2007).
6. 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006).
7. See In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1 118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1735; see also In re Marshall,
275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002); In re Marshall, 253 B.R. 550 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000).
8. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. at 1748.
9. Cf Hawthorne Sav. F.S.B. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 421 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to defer
to a Pennsylvania liquidation proceeding on the ground that the breach-of-contract claim was not a res in the
custody of the liquidating court). I will discuss Hawthorne in more detail in Part IV.
10. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006); see also Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004).
11. 1 am omitting three cases for present purposes. First is the Court's unanimous decision in Martin v.
Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (2005), in which the issue on certiorari was whether attomey's fees were
available under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) where a suit was improperly removed to federal court but the removing
party had an "objectively reasonable basis" for removing the case. Although the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Martin's suit, the propriety of that
decision was never before the Supreme Court. Second is the decision in Whitman v. Department of
Transportation, 126 S. Ct. 2014 (2006) (per curiam), in which the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision
that 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(l), part of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, did not confer original federal
jurisdiction on the district courts, but vacated and remanded to determine whether § 7121(a)(1) also divested
the lower federal courts of the jurisdiction they would otherwise possess under the general federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 2015-16; see Whitman v. Dept. of Trans., 382 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd,
126 S. Ct. 2014.
Third is the decision in Will v. Hallock, 126 S. Ct. 952 (2006), which rejected the availability of
[Vol. 42:553
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the merits where original federal jurisdiction was substantially in dispute. 12 In four of
the other five-Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 13 Lance v. Dennis,14 Wachovia Bank, N.A. v.
Schmidt,15 and Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche 16-the Court squarely rejected either (1)
the applicability of an exception to federal jurisdiction or (2) a narrow interpretation of
statutory jurisdiction, reversing the lower courts' decisions to the contrary in each of the
cases (Marshall, Lance, Schmidt, and Roche) where their jurisdiction had been at issue. 17
The only one of these half-dozen cases to reject federal jurisdiction-Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh 18--did so on complicated and hyper-narrow
grounds, and produced the only 5-4 divide in the six cases, 19 with Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Alito joining Justice Breyer's impassioned and somewhat intemperate
dissent.
20
What is perhaps most exceptional about what might best be called the
"jurisdictional success rate" is that it is, at least for recent Terms, unexceptional. A
similar pattern unfolded during the Court's 2004 Term, as reflected in the sweeping
denunciation of the eponymous Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Industries Corp.,21 the broader reading of the well-pleaded complaint rule adopted
in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing2 2 (at the
expense of two decades of lower-court decisions embracing expansive readings of the
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to take a collateral appeal from a decision refusing to apply the Federal
Tort Claims Act's judgment bar. Although Will rejected interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, it in no way
disapproved of federal jurisdiction ab initio. See also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006)
(holding that orders remanding cases to state courts for lack of preclusion under the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 are not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Kirby, 543
U.S. 14 (2004) (holding, in a diversity case, that federal jurisdiction would also have existed under the
admiralty jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)).
12. 1 should also note that this article does not discuss cases in which the Supreme Court considered its
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 from final decisions of state courts. Although those cases, too,
go to the existence vel non of federal jurisdiction, the issues are distinct enough so as to warrant separate
consideration. And yet, even those cases have unanimously resulted in pro-jurisdictional rulings in the last two
Terms. See eg Kan. v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006); Youngblood v. W. Va., 126 S. Ct. 2188 (2006) (per
curiam); Or. v. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226 (2006).
13. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
14. 126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per cunam).
15. 126 S. Ct. 941.
16. 546 U.S. 81.
17. Unlike the other four cases, the jurisdictional issue in Hamdan-whether the DTA, Pub. L. No. 109-
148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005), deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over Hamdan's
appeal-arose only after the Court had granted certiorari to review the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals.
18. 126 S. Ct. 2121 (2006).
19. The Hamdan Court was split 5-3 on the jurisdictional issue, with Chief Justice Roberts recused. 126
S. Ct. at 2750.
20. As Justice Breyer wrote,
[t]his case involves a dispute about the meaning of terms in a federal health insurance contract.
The contract, between a federal agency and a private carrier, sets forth the details of a federal health
insurance program created by federal statute and covering 8 million federal employees. In all this
the Court cannot find a basis for federal jurisdiction. I believe I can.
Empire Healthchoice Assurance. Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 2138 (Breyer, Kennedy, Souter & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
21. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
22. 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
2007]
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narrower view adopted in Merrell Dow Pharmacuticals Inc. v. Thompson 23), and the
endorsement of an expansive conception of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 in Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Services24 and Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods,
Inc.25  And the 2003 Term ended with what might be the Court's most important
jurisdictional decision of all of the cases noted herein, in which it sustained federal
jurisdiction over habeas petitions from Guantanamo Bay in Rasul v. Bush.26
What are we to make of this jurisdictional love-in? If the jurisdictional doctrines
are as clear in their narrowness as the Supreme Court decisions rejecting their application
make them out to be, why are the lower courts so wrong, so often, about the absence of
federal jurisdiction? And why, with the exception of Hamdan and perhaps Allapattah,
do these cases tend to be apolitical, at least from the outsider's viewpoint? More to the
point, what can we take away, going forward, about what these cases have to say vis-d-
vis the future of federal jurisdiction in the lower courts? Are these Supreme Court
decisions part of a coordinated reaffirmation of the supremacy of federal courts? Are
they nothing more than a series of coincidences? Or are the Supreme Court and the
lower courts talking past each other on jurisdictional issues, the former possibly
oblivious to the immense docket-clearing pressures faced by the latter, and the latter just
as unsympathetic to the former's attempt at coherent jurisdictional doctrine?
In this article, I attempt to explore these questions, using the 2005 Term (and, to
some degree, the 2004 Term), as the defining parameters of the inquiry. I begin in Part
II with the decisions themselves, exploring the underlying jurisdictional questions and
how they were resolved in the lower courts (where they were resolved at all), and
ascertaining what broader implications, if any, we might garner from the cases when
taken together. In Part III, I turn to four possible arguments for how the lower courts and
the Supreme Court came to view jurisdictional questions in so different a light,
examining the feasibility of each and suggesting possible counterarguments. Finally, in
Part IV, I address the potential implications, going forward, of the Court's increasingly
felicitous view toward federal jurisdiction, and the extent to which such a view may
implicate problems of the proper separation of powers both vis-A-vis the other branches
of the federal government and the state courts.
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND THE 2004-2005 TERMS
In an attempt at coherence, I consider the Court's various jurisdictional decisions
from the 2004 and 2005 Terms grouped into substantive categories, looking first at cases
involving what might best be described as "statutory" exceptions 27 to federal
23. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
24. 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
25. 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (action consolidated with Allapattah).
26. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The 2003 Term also included the pro-federal jurisdiction decisions in Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), and, arguably, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
In one significant case, though, the Court rejected federal jurisdiction in Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global
Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004).
27. At least in the statutory context, it is unconventional to think of these cases as involving "exceptions"
to federal jurisdiction. A more precise characterization might be "statutory limitations on pre-existing federal
junsdiction." For ease of reference, however, I will resort to the "exceptions" terminology throughout.
[Vol. 42:553
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jurisdiction, before moving on to the "doctrinal" exceptions, including the probate
exception at the core of Anna Nicole's case.
A. Hamdan and Jurisdiction-Stripping
No review of federal jurisdiction and the Supreme Court's 2005 Term could begin
without discussing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The jurisdictional issue, which arose only after
the Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 7, 2005, 2 8 was whether the
subsequently enacted Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) 29 divested the federal
courts-including the Supreme Court--of jurisdiction over Hamdan's habeas petition.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens focused on the ambiguity in section
1005(h), which defined the "effective date" of the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping
provisions:
(1) In General.-This section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Review of Combatant Status Tribunal and Military Commission Decisions.-
Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e) shall apply with respect to any claim whose review
is governed by one of such paragraphs and that is pending on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
3 0
Avoiding the constitutional avoidance canon, 3 1 the Hamdan Court instead relied
on "[o]rdinary principles of statutory construction," 32 concluding the emphasis in section
1005(h)(2) on the applicability of sections 1005(e)(2) and (e)(3) to pending cases cut
against the applicability of section 1005(e)(l)-the general jurisdiction-stripping
provision-to such ongoing litigation. 33 That is, because Congress, in DTA, was at
pains to specify that the exclusive review procedures of sections 1005(e)(2) and (e)(3)
would apply to pending cases, the "negative inference" was that the jurisdiction-stripping
language of section 1005(e)(1) would not.34 The Court also emphasized that earlier
versions of DTA lacked such a distinction, and that "Congress' rejection of the very
language that would have achieved the result the Government urges here weighs heavily
against the Government's interpretation." 3 5  Invoking a series of precedents for the
proposition that, as an effective date, section 1005(h)(1) was insufficient, on its own, to
establish the applicability of section 1005(e)(1) to pending cases, 36 the Court denied the
government's motion to dismiss and reached the merits of Hamdan's claims.
Especially in light of Justice Scalia's acerbic-if somewhat unconvincing-
28. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) (mem.).
29. 119 Stat. at 2739-44.
30. Id. at 2743-44.
31. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 n. 15.
32. Id. at 2764-65 (citing Lindh v Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1997)).
33. Id at 2766.
34. Id. at 2768. As the Court noted, "Because Hamdan, at least, is not contesting any 'final decision' of a
[combatant status review tribunal] or military commission, his action does not fall within the scope of
subsection (e)(2) or (e)(3)." Id. at 2769. Hamdan thus left open the question whether DTA would apply to
pending cases that did fall within the scope of sections 1005(e)(2) or (e)(3). See id. at 2769 n 14.
35. Id. at 2766 (citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 621-23 (2004)).
36. Id. at 2766 n. 9 (citing INS v St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 317 (2001)).
2007]
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dissent,37 there is much to say about the Court's resolution of the jurisdictional question.
Perhaps too much. Even assuming that the Court's application of "ordinary canons of
statutory interpretation" did not compel the result reached by the majority, it is not
difficult to see why resort to the constitutional avoidance canon would have compelled
the same result. In an analogous holding in INS v. St. Cyr, the Court rejected an
interpretation of a statute as foreclosing habeas jurisdiction and emphasized that "[t]he
fact that this Court would be required to answer the difficult question of what the
Suspension Clause protects is in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the
constitutional questions that would be raised by concluding that review was barred
entirely."
38
Thus, even if Justice Scalia was ultimately correct that DTA, if applied to
Hamdan's case, would violate neither the Suspension Clause, the Due Process Clause,
nor the Exceptions Clause of Article III (and such a conclusion is hardly a given), 39 the
mere need to resolve such fundamentally important constitutional claims would justify
interpreting an ambiguous statute so as to not raise those questions in the first place.
Because section 1005(h) of DTA was nothing if not ambiguous, Hamdan was ultimately
an easy-if surprising---case on the jurisdictional question.
B. Diversity and Supplemental Jurisdiction
Whereas Hamdan concerned an explicit attempt by Congress to take away federal
jurisdiction, 40 five other cases decided during the 2004 and 2005 Terms dealt with less
explicit statutory limits of such jurisdiction. Leaving aside, for the moment, the two
cases concerning the scope of the well-pleaded complaint rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1
begin with the three other cases, in all of which the Supreme Court reversed the narrow
constructions of federal jurisdiction adopted by the lower courts.
The first among the three is also perhaps the most significant. In Allapattah,4 1 the
Court answered what had been a long-debated question over the scope of supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity cases where the parties were completely diverse, but the claims
of additional plaintiffs under Rule 20 or Rule 23 did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-
controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.4 2 At least in the context of class actions,
37. Id. at 2810-18 (Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
38. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 n. 13; cf Stephen I. Vladeck, Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Suspension
Clause after St. Cyr, 113 Yale L.J. 2007 (2004) (suggesting some unintended consequences of St. Cyr's
constitutional avoidance rule).
39. See e.g. Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in the War on Terrorism, 2 Stan. J. Civ.
Rights & Civ. Liberties 259 (2005); see also Stephen 1. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right,
61 U. Miami L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (suggesting that the Suspension Clause applies equally in cases
involving citizens and non-citizens, and that Justice Scalia's analysis of the Suspension Clause in his dissent in
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), is therefore incompatible with his dissents in St. Cyr and Hamdan).
40. An attempt made even more explicit by the recently enacted Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), which removes most of the ambiguities on which the Hamdan Court
seized, and may well force resolution of the constitutional jurisdictional issues sidestepped in Hamdan.
41. 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
42. See e.g. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., Pleading and Procedure: State and Federal Cases and
Materials 42 (9th ed., Found. Press, Supp. 2006) ("The two questions answered by the Court were apparent
almost from the moment § 1367 was passed in 1990.").
[Vol. 42:553
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the Court had previously held, in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,43 that all plaintiffs
had to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. The question raised in Allapattah
was whether Congress, in enacting the supplemental jurisdiction statute-28 U.S.C.
§ 1367-in 1990, had also intended to overrule Zahn.
Writing for a 5-4 Court,44 Justice Kennedy answered that question in the
affirmative, resolving a sharp circuit split 45 by holding that so long as one of the
plaintiffs satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement, and so long as all of the
parties were completely diverse, § 1367 authorized supplemental jurisdiction over claims
by additional plaintiffs (under both Rule 20 and Rule 23) that did not satisfy the amount-
in-controversy requirement.
4 6
In so holding, Justice Kennedy rejected both what he described as the
"indivisibility theory"-that "all claims in the complaint must stand or fall as a single,
indivisible 'civil action' as a matter of definitional necessity" 47 -and the "contamination
theory"-that "the inclusion of a claim or party falling outside the district court's
original jurisdiction somehow contaminates every other claim in the complaint,
depriving the court of original jurisdiction over any of these claims.' '4 8 Thus, in fairly
stark terms, the Allapattah Court embraced an expansive conception of supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity cases, albeit subject to the statutory limits of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(b).4 9
In another case implicating the scope of federal jurisdiction in diversity cases,
although in far narrower terms, the Court unanimously held, in Roche,50 that diversity
jurisdiction (and, afortiori, removal of a diversity suit from state court) is not precluded
when the named defendant is completely diverse, but unnamed prospective defendants
are not. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg emphasized
Congress surely has not directed that a corporation, for diversity-of-citizenship purposes,
43. 414 U.S. 291 (1973), overruled, Allapattah, 545 U.S. 546.
44. Justice Kennedy wrote for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Souter, and Justice
Thomas. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions, the latter joined by Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, and Breyer. Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 547.
45. Allapattah was the consolidation of two cases. First is the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (11 th Cir. 2003), in which the court
had sustained supplemental jurisdiction in a class action where additional diverse plaintiffs did not satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement. Accord Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001); Olden v.
LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2004); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc, 77 F.3d
928 (7th Cir. 1996). Second is the First Circuit's Court of Appeals decision in Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,
370 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2004), in which the court had rejected supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 20 plaintiffs
who did not meet the amount in controversy requirement. Accord Meritcare, Inc. v St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998); Trimble v Asarco,
Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000).
46. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2625.
47. Id.at2621.
48. Id.
49. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), district courts lack supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule
19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332.
50. 546 U.S. 81 (2005).
2007]
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shall be deemed to have acquired the citizenship of all or any of its affiliates. For cases of
the kind the Roches have instituted, Congress has provided simply and only this
instruction: "[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business." The
jurisdictional rule governing here is unambiguous and it is not amenable to judicial
enlargement. Under § 1332(c)(1), Lincoln is a citizen of Texas alone, and under § 1441(a)
and (b), this case was properly removed.
5 1
Thus, Roche rejected the argument that an unnamed local defendant could prevent
removal of a diversity action where the named defendant was not "nominal." A
seemingly obvious proposition, except that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had
unanimously concluded to the contrary.
52
The pattern embodied in Roche-unanimous reversal by the Supreme Court of a
lower-court decision narrowly construing diversity jurisdiction-repeated itself in
Schmidt,53 in which the Court took up the question of the citizenship, for purposes of
federal diversity jurisdiction, of "national" banks. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1348, national
banks "shall... be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located."
The question before the Court was the meaning of the term "located." Judge Luttig,
writing for a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit, had held that "a national bank is located
where it operates branch offices," 54 rendering it virtually impossible for national banks
to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts either initially or via removal.
Writing (again) for a unanimous Court, 55 Justice Ginsburg disagreed and
concluded that the term "located" must mean only "the State in which [the bank's] main
office, as set forth in its articles of association, is located.",56  As Justice Ginsburg
explained,
in § 1348, "located" appears in a prescription governing not venue but federal-court
subject-matter jurisdiction. Concerning access to the federal court system, § 1348 deems
national banks "citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." There is no
reason to suppose Congress used those words to effect a radical departure from the norm.
An individual who resides in more than one State is regarded, for purposes of federal
subject-matter (diversity) jurisdiction, as a citizen of but one State. Similarly, a
corporation's citizenship derives, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, from its State of
incorporation and principal place of business. It is not deemed a citizen of every State in
which it conducts business or is otherwise amenable to personal jurisdiction. Reading
51. Id. at 616 (brackets in original) (citation omitted).
52. Roche v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 373 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 546 U.S. 81. The Fourth Circuit's
decision was predicated on the (apparently erroneous) assumption that Lincoln Property Company was a
limited partnership (in which case its "citizenship" for diversity purposes would be the citizenship of each of
the partners), and not a corporation. But see Roche, 126 S. Ct. at 613 ("The Roches, both citizens of Virginia,
acknowledge that Lincoln is indeed a corporation, not a partnership, and that Lincoln is chartered in and has its
principal place of business in Texas.").
53. 126 S. Ct. 941 (2006).
54. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 415 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 941. The
Second Circuit had adopted a similar view. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins Co., 345 F.3d
154, 161 (2d Cir. 2003). Two circuits-the Fifth and the Seventh-had adopted a contrary view. E.g Horton
v Bank One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2004); Firstar Bank, N.A v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 993-94
(7th Cir. 2001).
55. Justice Thomas did not participate in the decision. Schmidt, 126 S. Ct. at 942.
56. Id. at 945.
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§ 1348 in this context, one would sensibly "locate" a national bank for the very same
purpose, i.e., qualification for diversity jurisdiction, in the State designated in its articles of
association as its main office.
57
Given that both decisions resolved circuit splits, and that it is unsurprising that the
Court granted certiorari from the circuits it intended to disagree with, it is hard to read
too much into the disagreement between the lower courts and the Supreme Court in
Roche and Schmidt. That is not to say, however, that the two unanimous opinions
endorsing somewhat broader views of diversity jurisdiction are without any significance.
To the contrary, in subtle ways, both Roche and Schmidt open the jurisdictional door just
a little bit wider in diversity cases by narrowing the potential number of states of which
corporations and national banks, respectively, will be held to be citizens.
C. Federal Question Jurisdiction
In marked contrast to Roche and Schmidt, which arguably righted lower-court
decisions that departed from well-established precedent, the Court's 2005 decision in
Grable58 answered a question left open two decades earlier in Merrell Dow59-whether
a well-pleaded federal cause of action was necessary to the exercise of federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or merely sufficient. Specifically, in a state-law
quiet title action, could federal question jurisdiction be predicated on the interpretation of
a federal statute-a provision of the Internal Revenue Code-that did not itself create a
private cause of action but resolution of which was dispositive of the state-law claim?
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter answered that question in the affirmative:
Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the absence of a federal private right
of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the "sensitive judgments about
congressional intent" that § 1331 requires.... The Court saw the missing cause of action
not as a missing federal door key, always required, but as a missing welcome mat, required
in the circumstances, when exercising federal jurisdiction over a state misbranding action
would have attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising other state claims
with embedded federal issues.
[A] comparable analysis yields a different jurisdictional conclusion in this case. Although
Congress also indicated ambivalence in this case by providing no private right of action to
Grable, it is the rare state quiet title action that involves contested issues of federal law.
57. Id. at 951-52 (citations omitted); id. at 952 ("Treating venue and subject-matter jurisdiction
prescriptions as in pari materia, the Court of Appeals majority overlooked the discrete offices of those
concepts. The resulting Fourth Circuit decision rendered national banks singularly disfavored corporate bodies
with regard to their access to federal courts. The language of § 1348 does not mandate that incongruous
outcome, nor does this Court's precedent." (citation omitted)).
58. Grable, 545 U.S. 308.
59 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. 804.
60. For a summary of the mass confusion that plagued the lower courts, review Student Author, Mr Smith
Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 Harv. L.
Rev. 2272 (2002). The lower courts in Grable-the U.S. District Court for the Western Distnct of Michigan
and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals-both sustained federal jurisdiction. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods.,
Inc v. Darue Engr & Mfg., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 377 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2004),
affd, 545 U S. 308.
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Consequently, jurisdiction over actions like Grable's would not materially affect, or
threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation. Given the absence of threatening
structural consequences and the clear interest the Government, its buyers, and its
delinquents have in the availability of a federal forum, there is no good reason to shirk
from federal jurisdiction over the dispositive and contested federal issue at the heart of the
state-law title claim.
6 1
In subtle but perhaps important ways, Grable reaffirmed a broader view of federal
question jurisdiction, under which there need not be a federal cause of action to trigger
§ 1331. Although lower courts-and even the Supreme Court62-have struggled to
define the precise parameters of § 1331 in the absence of a federal cause of action,
63
there is little question that the answer is broader than the alternative.
Thus, taking the "statutory" cases together, the 2004 and 2005 Terms might fairly
be characterized as embracing broader conceptions of federal jurisdiction, even if only
doing so through baby steps.
D. Judge-Made Doctrinal Exceptions
More so than the "statutory" cases described above, however, the most prominent
and forceful of the Court's pro-jurisdiction decisions of the last two Terms have been in
cases involving two long-recognized (if over-interpreted) doctrinal exceptions to federal
jurisdiction-the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the probate exception. I consider each of
these in turn.
1. Rooker-Feldman
Scholars love to mock, ridicule, and otherwise decry what has become known as
the "so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine, ' 64 even wondering in print whether it's "worth
only the powder to blow it up?" 65 A thinly disguised, infrequently defined, and often
61. Grable, 545 U.S. at 318-20 (citation and footnote omitted). Justice Thomas filed a concurrence
expressing his agreement with the majority's application of precedent, but also noting his willingness to
consider whether the Court should instead adopt Justice Holmes' famous dissent in American Well Works v.
Layne & Bowler Co, 241 U.S. 257 (1916), which argued for requiring a federal cause of action to trigger
federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. Grable, 545 U.S. at 320-21 (Thomas, J., concurring); see id. at 318
(majority) ("At the end of Merrell Dow, Justice Holmes was still dissenting.").
62. One of the three jurisdictional arguments the Court rejected in McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121 (2006), was
that the state-law reimbursement action satisfied Grable because it required resolution of a question under the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8913. As Justice Ginsburg wrote for the
majority,
This case is poles apart from Grable. The dispute there centered on the action of a federal agency
(IRS) and its compatibility with a federal statute, the question qualified as "substantial," and its
resolution was both dispositive of the case and would be controlling in numerous other cases. Here,
the reimbursement claim was triggered, not by the action of any federal department, agency, or
service, but by the settlement of a personal-injury action launched in state court, and the bottom-line
practical issue is the share of that settlement properly payable to Empire.
Id. at 2137 (citations omitted).
63. For a decision in which the divided opinions manifest this divide, review Mikulski v Centerior Energy
Corp., 435 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated on reh "g en banc, No. 03-4486 (6th Cir. Apr. 26, 2006); see also
Nicodemus v. Union P Corp., 440 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006).
64. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up? 74 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1081, 1081 (1999).
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badly misunderstood confluence of principles of preclusion and vertical federalism,
Rooker-Feldman, at its simplest, operates as a bar on subject-matter jurisdiction in any
lower federal court over a lawsuit that is tantamount to an appeal of a final state court
decision. In that regard, the analogy to the "favorable termination" rule of Heck v.
Humphrey66 is inescapable-both doctrines purport to limit lawsuits that would require a
subsequent court to collaterally invalidate an earlier decision. As one article recently put
it, Rooker-Feldman "rests on inferences from two aspects of the federal courts' statutory
jurisdictional structure-that district-court jurisdiction is original, not appellate, and that
the Supreme Court is the only federal court given statutory appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of any state courts."
67
The Supreme Court, the story goes, had a much dimmer view of the doctrine than
the lower federal courts, to whom Rooker-Feldman became a quasi-magical means of
docket-clearing in the years after the latter of the eponymous twins-Feldman-was
decided.68 Indeed, the Supreme Court has actually applied Rooker-Feldman only twice,
in Rooker 69 and Feldman,70 despite literally hundreds, if not thousands, of lower federal
court decisions dismissing federal lawsuits entirely by reference to the doctrine. 7 1 As the
Court would note in Saudi Basic, "the doctrine has sometimes been construed to extend
far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding Congress'
conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state
courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U. S.
C. § 1738."72After years of lower-court uncertainty over the continuing scope of Rooker-
Feldman, the Supreme Court finally stepped in during the 2004 Term, unanimously
reining in the lower courts' excessive reliance on the doctrine in Saudi Basic.
73
At issue in Saudi Basic were royalty charges arising out of joint venture
66. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
67. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, "Inextricably Intertwined" Explicable at Last?:
Rooker-Feldman Analysis after the Supreme Court's Exxon Mobil Decision, 2006 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. I, 4 (2006)
(available at http://www.fclr.org/docs/2006fedctslrevl.pdf); see also Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Commn. of
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n. 3 (2002) ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is
a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over
state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court." (citation omitted)).
One oddity (among many) about Rooker-Feldman is that, to the extent it derives from the negative
implication of 28 U.S.C. § 1257-the statute governing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction from the
states-it would not make sense for it to apply to cases not covered by § 1257, e.g., where the underlying
lawsuit was based on state law and brought by diverse parties in state court.
68. According to one article, during a seven-year period in the 1990s, over 500 lawsuits were dismissed
on the basis of Rooker-Feldman alone. Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its
Jurisdictional Status, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1175, 1175 (1999) (citing Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism
in the Trenches. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1085 (1999)).
69. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co, 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
70. D.C. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
71. Sherry, supra n. 68, at 1088. As Justice Ginsburg explained,
Between 1923, when the Court decided Rooker, and 1983, when it decided Feldman, the Court cited
Rooker in one opinion, Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 283 (1946), in
reference to the finality of prior judgments. Rooker's only other appearance in the United States
Reports before 1983 occurs in Justice White's dissent from denial of certiorari in Florida State Bd.
of Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960, 961 (1971)).
Saudi Basic, 544 U.S. at 288 n. 3.
72. Saudi Basic, 544 U.S. at 283.
73. Id. at 280.
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agreements between Saudi Basic and two Exxon Mobil subsidiaries. Saudi Basic
brought a preemptive lawsuit in Delaware Superior Court, seeking declaratory judgment
that the royalty charges were consistent with the joint venture agreements. Two weeks
later, Exxon Mobil brought its own suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey, alleging that Saudi Basic had overcharged the royalties. 74 The Delaware state
suit eventually went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict exceeding $400 million in
favor of the Exxon Mobil defendants. 75 Meanwhile, Saudi Basic moved to dismiss the
federal lawsuit on the ground that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.76 After the district court denied the motion on the
ground that Saudi Basic waived its immunity by filing the Delaware state court suit,
77
Saudi Basic took an interlocutory appeal, which was heard over eight months after the
jury verdict in state court.
On its own motion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that, although federal
jurisdiction existed at the time Exxon Mobil filed the federal lawsuit, and although
Exxon Mobil, the plaintiff in the federal lawsuit, was hardly "appealing" an adverse state
court judgment, the jury verdict returned by the Delaware Superior Court served to
divest the federal courts of continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Rooker-Feldman. The
Supreme Court, in forceful language, reversed, emphasizing that Rooker-Feldman
is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant
preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay
or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.
79
Thus, the Saudi Basic Court unanimously held that federal jurisdiction over Exxon
Mobil's suit was not foreclosed:
This case surely is not the "paradigm situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a
federal district court from proceeding." ExxonMobil plainly has not repaired to federal
court to undo the Delaware judgment in its favor. Rather, it appears ExxonMobil filed suit
in Federal District Court (only two weeks after SABIC filed in Delaware and well before
any judgment in state court) to protect itself in the event it lost in state court on grounds
(such as the state statute of limitations) that might not preclude relief in the federal venue.
Rooker-Feldman did not prevent the District Court from exercising jurisdiction when
ExxonMobil filed the federal action, and it did not emerge to vanquish jurisdiction after
ExxonMobil prevailed in the Delaware courts.
80
Any lingering doubt about the forcefulness of Saudi Basic's strongly worded
renunciation of Rooker-Feldman was laid to rest early in the 2005 Term, in Lance v.
74.1d. at 289.
75. See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 13 (Del. 2005)
(summarizing the facts), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 422 (2005).
76. See28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000).
77. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d 378, 401-04 (D.N.J. 2002).
78. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2004).
79. Saudi Basic, 544 U.S. at 284.
80. Id. at 293-94 (citations and footnote omitted).
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Dennis.8 1  Lance was the third in a series of lawsuits arising out of Colorado's
redistricting after the 2000 census. In the first case, People ex rel. Salazar v.
Davidson,83 the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated a redistricting plan enacted by the
Colorado General Assembly on the ground that it violated the Colorado Constitution, and
instead ordered the Secretary of State to use a court-ordered plan. 84 In the second suit,
Keller v. Davidson,85 a three-judge federal district court held that Rooker-Feldman
precluded the defendants from amending their counterclaims to include additional claims
that sought to challenge the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Salazar.
86
Lance, the third suit, was filed by Colorado citizens unhappy with the decision in
Salazar seeking an order requiring the Colorado Secretary of State to use the
legislature's plan, rather than the plan fashioned by the Colorado Supreme Court." The
Lance suit alleged that the state constitutional provision relied upon by the Colorado
Supreme Court in Salazar was itself inconsistent with the Elections Clause of Article I of
the U.S. Constitution, 88 and the First Amendment's Petition Clause.89 A three-judge
federal district court dismissed the suit on the ground that Rooker-Feldman applied and
foreclosed jurisdiction.90  Exercising its mandatory appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court summarily reversed.
At the heart of the Court's decision was the question of privity.9 1 The district
court had concluded that the citizen plaintiffs in Lance were in privity with the Colorado
General Assembly, one of the losing parties in Salazar, and that Rooker-Feldman
therefore applied to bar their federal lawsuit.92  The Supreme Court disagreed,
concluding that the district court had erroneously conflated principles of preclusion with
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
Whatever the impact of privity principles on preclusion rules, Rooker-Feldman is not
simply preclusion by another name.... The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar actions
by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion
law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.3
Far more noteworthy than the majority's short per curiam reversal, however, is
Justice Stevens' dissent. Although Justice Stevens would have affirmed the district
81. 126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per curiam).
82. For a more recent survey of the background, review Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194, 1195-96
(2007) (per curiam).
83. 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003); 541 U.S. 1093 (2004).
84. Id. at 1283.
85. 299 F. Supp 2d 1171 (D. Colo. 2004) (three-judge court).
86. 79 P.3d at 1284.
87. Lance, 379 F. Supp. 2d. at 1122.
88. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4.
89. Id. at amend. 1.
90. Lance v Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Colo. 2005) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded,
546 U.S. 459.
91. Id. at 1124.
92. Id. at 1125.
93. Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1202 ("Incorporation of preclusion principles into Rooker-Feldman risks turning
that limited doctrine into a uniform federal rule governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments,
contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Act.").
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court's dismissal on other grounds, 94 he reiterated, at first, that the Court's rejection of
Rooker-Feldman in Lance demonstrated just how little of the doctrine survived the
Court's decision the previous Term in Saudi Basic:
Rooker and Feldman are strange bedfellows. Rooker, a unanimous, three-page opinion
written by Justice Van Devanter in 1923, correctly applied the simple legal proposition that
only this Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments. Feldman, a
nonunanimous, 25-page opinion written by Justice Brennan in 1983, was incorrectly
decided and generated a plethora of confusion and debate among scholars and judges. Last
Term, in Justice Ginsburg's lucid opinion in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp., the Court finally interred the so-called "Rooker-Feldman doctrine." And today, the
Court quite properly disapproves of the District Court's resuscitation of a doctrine that has95
produced nothing but mischief for 23 years.
Thus, whereas Saudi Basic had rejected Rooker-Feldman's applicability to a
"protective action" filed in federal court by a state court defendant while the state court
proceeding remained pending, Lance went an important step further, disclaiming
Rooker-Feldman's applicability to almost all federal lawsuits brought by non-losing
parties (including non-parties) in the relevant state court action.
96
Lower courts, in the aftermath of the two decisions, have begun to take the Court's
repudiation of Rooker-Feldman to heart, and the twin killing that Rooker-Feldman
received in Saudi Basic and Lance may fairly be characterized as a decisively pro-
jurisdiction result. As subsequent cases have suggested, Rooker-Feldman after Saudi
Basic and Lance is an incredibly narrow exception to federal jurisdiction, applying only
to lawsuits that are inescapably tantamount to appeals by state-court losers. 97 It is no
overstatement to describe the current Rooker-Feldman doctrine as but a shadow of its
former self.
2. The Probate Exception
I began this article by discussing the Supreme Court's decision in the Anna Nicole
case, Marshall v. Marshall.98  In important ways, Marshall is perhaps the best
microcosm of whatever jurisdictional trend we might infer from the last two Terms, and
looks, for all intent and purposes, very much like the anti-Rooker-Feldman decisions in
94. Id. at 1204 (arguing that issue preclusion should have precluded the plaintiffs' claims); but see id. at
1203 (Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., concurring) ("Although Justice Stevens has persuasively urged that issue
preclusion warrants affirmance, that question of Colorado law seems to me best left for full airing and decision
on remand." (citation omitted)).
95. Id. at 1203-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
96. On this point, the majority left the door open, but only barely. See id. at 1202 n. 2 ("In holding that
Rooker-Feldman does not bar plaintiffs here from proceeding, we need not address whether there are any
circumstances, however limited, in which Rooker-Feldman may be applied against a party not named in an
earlier state proceeding-e.g., where an estate takes a de facto appeal in a district court of an earlier state
decision involving the decedent.").
97. E.g. Turner v. Crawford Square Apts. IlL L.P., 449 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2006); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464
F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2006); Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the near
evisceration of Rooker-Feldman). For two rare examples of circuit court decisions upholding application of
Rooker-Feldman after Saudi Basic and Lance, review O'Malley v. Lutscher, 465 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.) (per
curiam), and Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2006).
98. 126 S. Ct. 1735.
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Saudi Basic and Lance.
The facts of Marshall, save for perhaps the dollar signs, are unextraordinary.
Vickie Lynn Marshall (Anna Nicole Smith) married J. Howard Marshall II, in June 1994.
J. Howard died in August 1995, leaving almost all of his estate to his son, Pierce,
through a living trust and a "pourover" will, even though Vickie Lynn maintained that J.
Howard had intended to provide for her financial security upon his death via a "catch-
all" trust. While J. Howard's will was subject to ongoing probate proceedings in state
court in Harris County, Texas, Vickie Lynn filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Central District of California in January, 1996. Pierce subsequently filed a
proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, alleging that Vickie Lynn was liable for
defamation arising out of claims made by her lawyers about Pierce's interference with J.
Howard's will. Vickie Lynn answered and counterclaimed, alleging tortious interference
with an inter vivos gift, which converted the bankruptcy filing into an adversary
proceeding. After a trial on the merits, the bankruptcy court entered judgment for Vickie
Lynn, awarding $449 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive
damages. Pierce objected, arguing for the first time that the "probate exception" to
federal jurisdiction prevented the bankruptcy court from proceeding to the merits of
Vickie Lynn's counterclaim.
99
The bankruptcy court held that Pierce's "probate exception" argument had been
waived. On appeal, the district court disagreed with the conclusion that applicability of
the probate exception was waivable, but held that, in any event, the exception did not
apply.100 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that
[t]he reach of the probate exception encompasses not only direct challenges to a will or
trust, but also questions which would ordinarily be decided by a probate court in
determining the validity of the decedent's estate planning instrument. Such questions
include fraud, undue influence upon a testator, and tortious interference with the testator's
intent. 10 1
The Supreme Court disagreed. After summarizing the somewhat dubious history
of the probate exception, which, like the "domestic relations" exception, arguably
derives from language contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789,102 the Court concluded
that it "need not consider in this case whether there exists any uncodified probate
exception to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction under § 1334," because "Vickie Marshall's
claim falls far outside the bounds of the probate exception described in Markham [v.
Allen]."'10 3 As Justice Ginsburg wrote for a unanimous Court,
99. Id. at 1742. For a summary of the facts, review id. at 1741-44; Marshall, 253 B.R. at 553-56.
100. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. at 1743.
101. Marshall, 392 F.3d at 1133.
102. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700 (1992) (anchoring the domestic relations exception
in the original language of the Judiciary Act's grant of federal diversity jurisdiction, which extended to "suits
of a civil nature at common law or in equity"). Thus, the domestic relations exception, and the probate
exception after it, see Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946), has been justified largely by the extent to
which certain actions were not cognizable before English Courts of Chancery in 1789. Cf. Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo S.A v. Alliance BondFund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999). For a persuasive argument that there is
no support in Chancery practice for the existence of any probate exception, see John F. Winkler, The Probate
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 Prob. L.J. 77 (1997).
103. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. at 1746.
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Vickie's claim does not involve the administration of an estate, the probate of a will, or any
other purely probate matter. Provoked by Pierce's claim in the bankruptcy proceedings,
Vickie's claim, like Carol Ankenbrandt's, alleges a widely recognized tort .... Vickie
seeks an in personam judgment against Pierce, not the probate or annulment of a will....
Nor does she seek to reach a res in the custody of a state court.
Furthermore, no sound policy considerations militate in favor of extending the probate
exception to cover the case at hand. Trial courts, both federal and state, often address
conduct of the kind Vickie alleges. State probate courts possess no special
proficiency... in handling [such] issues.104
Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's alternative holding that the Texas Probate Court's
conclusion that it had exclusive jurisdiction ousted the federal district court's authority,
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded to allow the lower courts to consider
Pierce's other arguments.1
05
As in Lance, however, perhaps the more interesting opinion came from Justice
Stevens, who wrote separately to concur in part and concur in the judgment. Justice
Stevens did not object to the majority's conclusion that Anna Nicole's claim fell outside
the "probate exception"; he objected to its refusal to do away with the probate exception
altogether:
To be sure, there are cases that support limitations on federal courts' jurisdiction over
the probate and annulment of wills and the administration of decedents' estates. But
careful examination reveals that at least most of the limitations so recognized stem not
from some sui generis exception, but rather from generally applicable jurisdictional rules.
Some of those rules, like the rule that diversity jurisdiction will not attach absent an inter
partes controversy, plainly are still relevant today. Others, like the rule that a bill in equity
will lie only where there is no adequate remedy elsewhere, have less straightforward
application in the wake of 20th-century jurisdictional developments. Whatever the
continuing viability of these individual rules, together they are more than adequate to the
task of cabining federal courts' jurisdiction. They require no helping hand from the so-
called probate exception.
Rather than preserving whatever vitality that the "exception" has retained as a result of
the Markham dicta, I would provide the creature with a decent burial in a grave adjacent to
the resting place of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
106
At most, then, the probate exception after Marshall "reserves to state probate
courts the probate or annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent's estate; it
also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the
custody of a state probate court."107 And yet, one important post-Marshall case suggests
that Justice Stevens may well have his way, and that the probate exception may well
disappear altogether.
In Jones v. Brennan,10 8 Judge Posner rejected the district court's applicability of
104. Id. at 1748-49 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. at 1750.
106. Id at 1751-52 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 1758.
108. 465 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2006).
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the probate exception, even though the plaintiffs civil rights suit was "complaining
simply about the maladministration of her father's estate by the Cook County probate
court,... tantamount to asking the federal district court to take over the administration
of the estate. That clearly would violate the probate exception." 10 9 In reversing the
district court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that one of the plaintiff's
claims-for mismanagement of her father's estate-"does not ask the court in which it is
filed to administer the estate, but rather to impose tort liability on the guardians for
breach of fiduciary duty."1 10 Although the basis for original jurisdiction might have
fallen within the probate exception, the court was unwilling to dismiss the entire lawsuit
on the record before it because of the possibility that supplemental jurisdiction existed
over the breach of fiduciary duty claim.III What Jones suggests, then, is that the probate
exception may only apply when it is absolutely clear that the only basis for federal
jurisdiction is a claim directly attacking the property in possession of the state probate
court, a narrow class of lawsuits, indeed.
All told then, the Court's decisions in Saudi Basic, Lance, and Marshall reduce
almost to nothingness two longstanding and oft-invoked doctrinal exceptions to federal
jurisdiction. That the Court was aware of the relationship between the decisions is
obvious, given the explicit link between Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Lance and
his opinion concurring in the judgment in Marshall. For whatever reason, the Court
seemed bent, during the 2004 and 2005 Terms, on reining in excessive and unduly
expansive lower-court interpretations of exceptions to federal jurisdiction. But why?
And why now?
1II. THE LOWER COURTS VS. THE SUPREME COURT: FOUR THEORIES
To whatever extent there is a pattern to be found in the Supreme Court's
jurisdictional decisions over the past two Terms, 112 obvious explanations for such a
pattern are not easily found. It is possible, of course, that the Court was merely
confronted with a series of bad lower-court decisions overreaching in their interpretation
of limitations in federal jurisdictional statutes, or of doctrinal exceptions to federal
jurisdiction such as Rooker-Feldman and the probate exception. And yet, the timing is
perhaps the best indicator that the coincidence of these cases are not just fortuitous.
In this part, I investigate four possible theories: first, that the trend reflects the
simple and unsurprising truth that, in response to increasing pressure on the district
courts to manage their overcrowded dockets, there is no simpler or more efficient means
of disposing of cases than by rejecting subject-matter jurisdiction. Second, I consider the
jurisdictional trend as a variation on the "Backdoor Federalization" thesis proposed by
109. Id. at 307.
110. Id. at 307-08.
111. See id. at 308-09.
112. 1 have not devoted much of this article to suggesting that this trend in the last two Terms, to whatever
extent it is deliberate, is also new. But as one article suggests, in the five years leading up to (and including)
the 2002 Term, the Court displayed something of a "conservative" trend in cases in which federal jurisdiction
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Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey, 113 specifically that there has been an increasing
trend of "partial federalization" of areas historically governed by state law. Although the
narrowing of anti-jurisdictional doctrines does not neatly dovetail with the topics
surveyed by Issacharoff and Sharkey, I suggest that some of the same trends may explain
both results. Third, after suggesting that neither of the first two explanations sufficiently
account for the timing of this trend-that is, why the last two Terms, in particular, have
seen the emergence of such a pro-jurisdiction view-I suggest that there may be deeper
separation of powers concerns at work in these cases, particularly in light of the unusual
volume of jurisdiction-conferring and jurisdiction-stripping legislation enacted by the
109th Congress.
Finally, and given the extent to which the separation-of-powers theory provides
little insight into the decisions in Saudi Basic, Lance, and Marshall, I suggest that we
might better conceive of these decisions as part of the Court's new jurisdictional
formalism, a (perhaps inevitable) result of the aftermath of the 1998 decision in Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a better Environment,114 which, in rejecting the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction, has been mistakingly overestimated as turning the existence of federal
jurisdiction into a far more formalistic inquiry than even the Steel Co. Court intended.
That is to say, perhaps most of these decisions can best be explained as the Supreme
Court's response to the lower courts' implicit (but undeniable) overreaction to Steel Co.,
especially when considered alongside the Court's increasing frustration with lower-court
decisions holding that various time limits or substantive statutory requirements are
"jurisdictional." Indeed, perhaps what these cases really teach us is that the new
jurisdictional formalism is really just a new variation on the old jurisdictional
minimalism.
A. Docket Clearing
The easiest explanation is also the one that is most quickly rejected. No one
seriously contests that federal judges are overworked,1 15 and that the increase in the size
of federal court dockets in recent years (and decades) has far outstripped, by several
orders of magnitude, the rather stable size of the federal judiciary."' With the
increasing workload, the obvious pressures on district judges (and circuit judges) to
avoid reaching the merits of any lawsuit in which a dispositive procedural obstacle may
be found are undeniable. And especially with respect to Rooker-Feldman, it has long
been suggested that the warm reception the doctrine received in the district courts was
113. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1353
(2006); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agenctes and the Federalization of Tort Law,
56 DePaul L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).
114. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
115. E.g. Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846, 858 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Super. Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Dyk, J., dissenting)
("District courts already are overworked and we need not add to their burden.").
116. See William H. Rehnquist, 2004 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 10 n. 1 (2005) (available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf) (noting an overall nineteen-
percent increase in civil filings over the previous ten years); id. at 10 n. 3 (noting an overall fifty-five percent
increase in criminal filings over the previous ten years); id. at 10 n. 2 (noting a twenty-five percent increase in
appeals to the twelve regional courts of appeals over the same period).
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directly related to its utility as a docket-clearing device.' 17
Thus, the "docket clearing" theory posits that district courts have clear incentives
to under-interpret jurisdictional statutes and to over-interpret doctrinal exceptions
thereto. If given a choice between two competing interpretations of a statute, one which
confirms the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction and one which rejects it, it hardly
strains credulity to understand why judges would choose the anti-jurisdiction
interpretation, particularly where, as in virtually all non-habeas cases, 118 a state-court
forum remains available.
As will become clear with respect to most of the possible explanations for this
jurisdictional trend, the docket-clearing theory cannot overcome the most obvious
question: why now? Civil filings in federal court actually declined in 2005 as compared
to 2004,119 and there is no other obvious explanation for why docket-clearing pressures,
at least in the district courts, 12 would be any greater today than at any prior point during
the last decade. Thus, whereas there is every reason to expect overworked judges to
embrace narrower conceptions of federal jurisdiction, there is no reason why there would
be any noticeable increase in such decisions in the past several years, as compared to the
past decade on the whole. Simply put, docket clearing is unconvincing simply because it
is too generic, and does not do the work of explaining why, all of a sudden, the Supreme
Court would be particularly sensitive to the scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction in
the lower courts.
B. Federal Jurisdiction and "Backdoor Federalization"
The second possibility is best understood as an analogy to Issacharoff and
Sharkey's "Backdoor Federalization" thesis-that "that the U.S. Supreme Court has, in
preemption and forum-allocation cases, attempted to capture the considerable benefits
that flow from national regulatory uniformity and to protect an increasingly unified
national (and international) commercial market from the imposition of externalities by
unfriendly state legislation."' 12 1  Thus, Issacharoff and Sharkey argue, "federal
117. E.g Bandes, supra n. 68.
118. Notwithstanding the "presumption of concurrent jurisdiction." Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
State courts generally lack the authority to entertain habeas petitions brought by federal prisoners. Tarble 's
Case, 80 U.S. 397 (1872); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859).
119. See John G. Roberts, Jr., 2005 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 8 (2006) (available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2005year-endreport.pdf) (noting a ten-percent decline in
civil filings).
120. The Courts of Appeals present something of a different story. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his
2005 Year-End Report,
Filings in the regional courts of appeals rose 9 percent to an all-time high of 68,473, marking the
10th consecutive record-breaking year and the 11 th successive year of growth. This increase
stemmed from upswings in criminal appeals, original proceedings, and prisoner petitions following
the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) and U.S. v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and from continued growth in appeals of administrative agency
decisions involving the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). As large as the increase is, it would
have been higher had not the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's operations been affected by
Hurricane Katrina.
Id. at 8 n. 2.
121. Issacharoff& Sharkey, supra n. 113, at 1356.
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substantive law and federal forum law, in tandem, serve to stave off the inherent risk of
predation-when one state encroaches upon the decisional autonomy of another." 
12 2
Preemption, then, is perhaps the central player to backdoor federalization, for it preserves
horizontal federalism-the allocation of power as between the states-by reinforcing
vertical federalism-the supremacy of federal law.
There is a superficial correlation between backdoor federalization and broader
conceptions of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, because a federal judicial forum is
inevitably a central player in the "national regulatory uniformity" that is the ultimate end
to which backdoor federalization aspires. And yet, the analogy is not much more than
superficial. Whereas preemption displaces state substantive law, federal jurisdiction
does not, at least of its own operation. Indeed, in most of the cases surveyed in this
article, the existence of federal jurisdiction was to provide a federal forum for the
vindication of claims based on state law, e.g., Marshall, Saudi Basic, Grable, Roche,
Schmidt, and Allapattah. Absent some suggestion that federal resolution of state-law
cases implicates and otherwise manifests partial federalization in ways that state court
resolution would not, the backdoor federalization thesis simply cannot carry the weight
of the cases surveyed herein.
C. Federal Jurisdiction and the Separation of Powers
A third possible explanation for the Court's increasing sensitivity to overbearing
lower-court constraints on federal jurisdiction derives largely from Hamdan. Although
the Court in Hamdan concluded that DTA did not apply, and therefore did not divest it of
jurisdiction over Hamdan's case, 123 there is little question that the 109th Congress took
an unusually aggressive approach to federal jurisdiction, and to its relationship with the
federal judiciary more generally. Consider, briefly, the list of statutes enacted by the
109th Congress implicating federal jurisdiction (in chronological order): The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005,124 the Terri Schiavo Bill, 125 the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 126 the REAL ID Act of 2005,127 the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,128 and, with some smaller statutes in the middle, 129 the
increasingly notorious Military Commissions Act of 2006.130 Indeed, it might fairly be
suggested that Congress has not taken such a specific and case-by-case interest in federal
jurisdiction since the time of Reconstruction and the great debates over the Military
Reconstruction Act 13 1 (and Congress' attempts to preclude the Supreme Court from
122. Id. at 1431.
123. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762-69.
124. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
125. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
126. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
127. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302-23 (2005).
128. 119 Stat. at 2739-44.
129. Eg Act of Dec. 20, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-133, 119 Stat. 2573 (2005) (expanding federal
jurisdiction with respect to various crimes on Pueblo lands in New Mexico).
130. 120 Stat 2600.
131. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 163, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
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pronouncing upon its constitutionality 132). Nor has this interest been solely in the
direction of curtailing the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Class Action Fairness
Act, for one, expands federal jurisdiction in some exceedingly important respects, 13 3 and
the Schiavo bill was arguably necessary to overcome the jurisdictional bar that Rooker-
Feldman might have interposed. So, too, the REAL ID Act actually restores to the direct
appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts the authority to decide entire classes of claims
over which jurisdiction had been foreclosed by Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996134 and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996,135 albeit while foreclosing habeas jurisdiction over the same claims in the
process. 136
Regardless of where one comes down on the merits of each individual measure, it
seems clear that Congress has increasingly come to view its power over federal
jurisdiction as an important means by which it can achieve substantive policy outcomes.
With that increase, however, comes a wholly unsurprising concern for the separation of
powers, which are understandably implicated by too much congressional interference in
the workload and operation of the federal courts. 1
37
Concomitant with the growing concern over the trend of congressional interference
in federal jurisdiction has been the reaffirmation by the Supreme Court of a clear
statement rule in the jurisdiction-stripping context. Thus, in Hamdan, the Court's
jurisdictional analysis turned entirely on the absence of a clear statement in the DTA that
the jurisdiction stripping was intended to apply to pending cases. 13 8 Although Justice
Scalia has criticized the Court's jurisdiction-stripping jurisprudence as requiring a
"superclear statement" (or "magic words"), 139 there are important institutional
prerogatives served by such an interpretive canon. Because of the myriad constitutional
issues that jurisdiction-stripping legislation raises-issues that are only heightened in the
context of statutes depriving the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction-there is every
reason for courts to assume, absent an absolutely express statement from Congress, that
no desire to reach the underlying constitutional questions exists. 140
The question that emerges, then, is whether we might re-conceive of the Court's
jurisdictional jurisprudence in non-jurisdiction-stripping cases as also moving toward
132. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868); see generally William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229 (1973).
133. See generally Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions after the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 41
Tulsa L. Rev. 1593 (2006).
134. Pub L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
135. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546-3009-724.
136. For an intriguing survey of the issues raised by REAL ID's reallocation of jurisdiction, see Aaron G.
Leiderman, Student Author, Preserving the Constitution's Most Important Human Right: Judicial Review of
Mixed Questions under the REAL ID Act, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1367 (2006).
137. E.g. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272-75 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J.,
specially concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (suggesting that the Schiavo bill unconstitutionally
infnnges upon the separation of powers).
138. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2763-64.
139. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326-27 (2001) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
140. Id. at 301 n. 13 (majority) ("The fact that this Court would be required to answer the difficult
question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the
constitutional questions that would be raised by concluding that review was barred entirely.").
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this principle. Whereas jurisdiction stripping specifically implicates the due process
rights of litigants (and the Suspension Clause rights of detainees in habeas cases), undue
jurisdictional interference, even in non-stripping cases, may more broadly implicate the
proper separation of powers, largely for the reasons traced by Judge Birch in his Schiavo
opinion.14 1 So understood, the Court might tacitly be moving its entire jurisprudence
concerning the scope of federal jurisdiction toward more of a clear statement regime,
narrowing exceptions that have been read into statutory language, or that have resulted
from judge-made law, in the absence of clear indicia of congressional intent. These
cases, then, might be seen as the opening salvo in the coming separation-of-powers
conflict, or, perhaps, as the Court's attempt to clear the doctrine of unnecessary
underbrush before the true interbranch conflict arises.
Hamdan, at least, would fit into such a paradigm. But, with the possible exception
of Allapattah, none of the Court's other jurisdictional decisions from the last two Terms
are easily reconciled with this theory. Take Grable, for example-there, the Supreme
Court interpreted the scope of the judicially created "well-pleaded complaint rule,"
which is, at best, only implicitly tied to the text of § 133 1.142 Neither Saudi Basic nor
Marshall can really be seen as rejecting an insufficiently clear statement of congressional
intent to deny federal jurisdiction. Concerns over the proper separation of powers may
well have been a serious motivating factor behind the jurisdictional analysis in Hamdan,
and to some degree Allapattah, but it helps to explain little else about the jurisdictional
jurisprudence of the 2004 and 2005 Terms.
D. The New Jurisdictional Formalism: Whither Steel Co.?
Whereas each of the theories above may have something to do with some of the
Court's decisions in jurisdictional cases from the last two Terms, none of them, as I have
suggested, convincingly tie the decisions together. And yet, there is one more possible
explanation that transcends both the type of jurisdiction at issue and the
federalism/separation-of-powers implications at stake in each case: The aftermath of
Steel Co.
Much has been written about the Court's 1998 decision in Steel Co., 143 in which
the Court rejected the doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction," wherein lower courts had
often reached the merits of cases where jurisdiction presented a close question, but the
merits were easily resolved in favor of the party opposing jurisdiction. 144 That is, courts
assumed the existence of jurisdiction in order to reach (and decide) easier questions on
the merits. In sweeping and formalistic terms, Steel Co. emphasized that subject-matter
jurisdiction either did or did not exist, but that the federal courts lacked the authority to
do anything, including decide easier questions on the merits, unless they first satisfied
141. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1272-75.
142. Grable, 546 U.S. 308.
143. 523 U.S. 83 (1998); e.g. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional? 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1207
(2001); Jack H. Friendenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 258 (2000); Scott C.
Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2001);
and Joshua Schwartz, Student Author, Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a Broader "Arising Under"
Jurisdictional Question, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2255 (2004).
144. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 99-102.
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themselves as to the presence of subject-matter jurisdiction.145
The response to Steel Co. in the lower courts was hardly surprising. All of a
sudden, the lower courts became preoccupied with the existence vel non of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction, and also with questions as to what aspects of a lawsuit are, in
the first instance, "jurisdictional" (because Steel Co. denied to the lower courts the power
to ignore, or at least forestall resolution of, such questions). Thus, the aftermath of Steel
Co. saw a dramatic upsurge in lower-court opinions deciding "jurisdictional" questions.
Even after the Court slightly retreated from Steel Co. in the Marathon Oil case in
1999,146 the reaction in the lower courts was a newfound respect (perhaps too much so)
for the scope of federal jurisdiction.
That the lower courts went too far in reacting to the Supreme Court is hardly
surprising, given the literalistic formalism that pervades the majority opinion in Steel Co.
If "jurisdiction" is to be such an immutable and unwaivable construct, then such a
conception necessarily results in enormous pressure on the lower courts first to identify
the range of issues that are "jurisdictional," and then to decide whether jurisdiction
exists. 
147
So construed, a second relevant line of cases to consider alongside the pro-
jurisdiction decisions are those recent cases in which the Court has reversed lower-court
decisions holding that aspects of a lawsuit are "jurisdictional" when they are not. Last
Term, for example, the Court unanimously held, per Justice Ginsburg, that the
numerosity requirement for establishing whether a company is an "employer" within the
meaning of Title VII is not jurisdictional, 14 8 reversing a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision to the contrary.149 Emphasizing that "[D]urisdiction ... is a word of many, too
many, meanings," the Court held that the numerosity requirement was an element of the
plaintiffs substantive Title VII claim, and that the defendant therefore waived its claim
that it was not satisfied by failing to object until after the trial court entered judgment. 150
To similar effect was the Court's unanimous 2003 decision in Kontrick v. Ryan,
15 1
in which Justice Ginsburg, again writing for the Court, held that the time limit for
objecting to discharge of a bankruptcy by contesting the timeliness of the original
complaint was not jurisdictional. 152  Whereas "a court's subject-matter jurisdiction
cannot be expanded to account for the parties' litigation conduct; a claim-processing
rule, on the other hand, even if unalterable on a party's application, can nonetheless be
145. ld at 101-02.
146. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999). Just this term, the Court further clarified that
Steel Co. does not preclude resolution of forum non convenions claims of jurisdiction. Sinochem Intl. Co. v.
Malaysian Intl. Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007).
147. Indeed, various Justices bemoaned the seeming inflexibility of the majority opinion on precisely
these grounds. Eg., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 11l (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
148. Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. 1235. Justice Alito did not participate For a far more thorough treatment of
Arbaugh, and one that argues that the Court did not go far enough in drawing the divide between subject-matter
jurisdiction and the substantive merits (in similar form as Justice Stevens' concurrence in Marshall), review
Howard Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 Tulsa L. Rev. 579 (2007).
149. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004).
150. Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1241-42, 1244-45 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90).
151. 540 U.S. 443 (2004).
152. Id. at 459-60.
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forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point." 153 A few weeks
later, in Scarborough v. Principi,154 the Court, once more per Justice Ginsburg,
reaffirmed the extent to which most time limits do not implicate the federal courts'
subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the thirty-day time limit for filing an application
for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act15
5 is not "jurisdictional."'156
I mention these cases not to expand the scope of this article, but to suggest that
they support this conception of what is truly driving the Court in most of the present
"jurisdictional" cases. That is, perhaps what we are seeing in the decisions of the 2004
and 2005 Terms is the Supreme Court's reaction to the lower courts' overreaction to the
Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. The Court, in formalistic terms, is emphasizing
the narrow scope of what it means for an issue to be "jurisdictional," and is, in the
process, narrowing the scope of previously recognized exceptions to that jurisdiction.
For lack of a better term, we might conceive of this trend as a new jurisdictional
formalism, eschewing broad conceptions of what is "jurisdictional" and embracing broad
conceptions of what "jurisdiction" is. Put differently, if the Court is to take such a
formalistic view toward federal jurisdiction, it makes sense that the Court would also
take a far more literal view toward its scope. The "virtually unflagging obligation"
identified in prior cases 157 becomes all the more so with respect to those facets of a
lawsuit that actually are "jurisdictional."
IV. CONCLUSION
Whatever the ultimate explanation for the Court's movement toward broader
conceptions of federal jurisdiction, the remaining question is what implications this trend
might have in future cases. On a case-by-case basis, the answer is readily discernable.
Marshall, as discussed above, narrows the probate exception almost to the point of
nonexistence. Saudi Basic and Lance, too, render Rooker-Feldman a mere shadow of its
former self. But as we approach the tenth anniversary of Steel Co., what implications
might this new jurisdictional formalism have in other areas of the law of federal
jurisdiction, or of federal law more generally?
One obvious potential target is abstention doctrine, which, like the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine and the probate exception, has long been far more well-received in the
lower courts than in the Supreme Court. Particularly vulnerable may be the form of
abstention deriving from the Burford v. Sun Oil Co. decision, 15 8 under which federal
courts are to abstain from entertaining lawsuits that might interfere with complex state
administrative processes. For one quick example of the decreasing utility of Burford,
153. Id. at 444-45.
154. 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000).
156. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 413-14 (citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454-55); but see id. at 426-27
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the thirty-day filing limit, because it constitutes a waiver of the federal
government's sovereign immunity, is not waivable, without suggesting that it is therefore "jurisdictional"); cf
Katherine Florey, Student Author, Insufficiently Jurisdictional: The Case against Treating State Sovereign
Immunity as an Article III Doctrine, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1375 (2004).
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consider the Ninth Circuit's 2004 decision in Hawthorne Savings Bank v. Reliance
Insurance Co. of Illinois,15 9 taking a narrow view of the scope of the federal abstention
doctrine and focusing instead on whether California state law would require a California
state court to defer to a Pennsylvania insurance insolvency proceeding. 16  As the court
concluded in summarizing the narrow scope of Burford, "abstention under [Burford] in
cases removed to federal court is inappropriate when the state court from which the case
was removed is in no better position to protect the state interests arguably impaired by
the exercise of federal jurisdiction."16 1
Such a decision manifests the narrower approach to jurisdictional exceptions that
may well be the pervasive theme going forward. In rejecting Burford abstention, the
Ninth Circuit was at pains to first identify the situations in which Burford was meant to
apply, and then to carefully consider whether the case before it fell within those narrow
parameters. Thus, we might view the result of the new jurisdictional formalism from the
perspective of the lower courts as a far more rigorous jurisdictional inquiry, to assure that
the case sub judice falls squarely within the narrow scope of previously recognized
exceptions to federal jurisdiction. At bottom, lower-court expansions of jurisdictional
exceptions seem to be buried, in the grave described by Justice Stevens, alongside both
Rooker-Feldman and the probate exception.
But it does not stop there. The animating principle behind the theory that may
itself be behind these decisions is the concept that federal subject-matter jurisdiction
truly is black and white, with very little gray area. A far smaller class of rules are
"jurisdictional," and the conferral of subject-matter jurisdiction is subject to far fewer
implicit exceptions. Necessarily, this conception of jurisdiction will shift judicial
resources far more toward the merits of lawsuits-and, if nothing else, will therefore
further burden an overworked federal judiciary, with far fewer jurisdictional dismissals
(and 'far more work in cases that might previously have disappeared) as an inevitable
result. Especially given the trend in other areas of jurisprudence toward hostility to
litigation, 162 to which the Court's jurisdictional jurisprudence provides an odd and
countervailing example, the increasing felicitousness toward the availability of a federal
forum should necessarily reinvigorate the debate over how to relieve the enormous
pressures faced by federal judges today, while keeping the courthouse doors open to
those litigants who would choose to walk through them.
But perhaps the harder question is how, if at all, this trend will have ramifications
for other substantive areas of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence (or, perhaps, for those
rare cases in which it is asked to pronounce upon the constitutional scope of federal
jurisdiction 16). Steel Co., its detractors notwithstanding, has proven to be a watershed
159. 421 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended, 433 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2006).
160. See Hawthorne, 421 F.3d at 844-49.
161. Id. at 846 n. 9.
162. E.g. Siegel, supra n. 4.
163. Eg. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 446, 459 (1957) (Burton &
Harlan, JJ., concurring in the result); id. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For a discussion of one important
(and currently pending) question concerning the constitutional scope of federal jurisdiction with respect to
habeas petitions brought by detainees in foreign or international custody, review Stephen 1. Vladeck,
Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, andArticle II1, 95 Geo. L.J. _ (forthcoming 2007).
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moment in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence not just on federal subject-matter
jurisdiction, but on the structural allocation of power as between the federal courts and
both the other branches of the federal government and the states. Steel Co. ushered in a
new era of jurisdictional formalism; that, almost a decade later, we are still assessing the
true importance of that move-and still taking stock of its myriad reverberations-
testifies to just how pronounced an effect it has had, and will ultimately have, on the
business of the federal judiciary.
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